Electrolux turned the tables on former distributor-turned-competitor Imig, Inc., which filed a complaint against the famous vacuum and home appliance company, for interfering with relationships with perspective customers. Electrolux filed several counterclaims, alleging that Imig copied Electrolux’s protected trade dress, copyright protected user manuals, and that Imig made false claims in its advertising.

The district court dismissed all of Imig’s claims on summary judgment, and found for Electrolux on copyright infringement and false advertising. The court found that Imig had copied the user manuals in violation of U.S. Copyright law. From a false advertising perspective, the court found that specific numerically based claims about the Imig vacuum’s superiority were false on their face, because the products did not actually meet those objective standards. The remaining counterclaims proceeded to trial. On March 31, 2008, the court issued its finding that Electrolux had not met its burden of establishing a protectable trade dress in its vacuum and therefore, did not find Imig liable.

The facts show that Imig, afraid that it would lose its distributorship of the Electrolux SANITAIRE brand, developed its PERFECT brand vacuum as a replacement. Discovery produced evidence of copying: in creating the PERFECT design, Imig referred its Chinese manufacturer to the specifications of the SANITAIRE line. It was also revealed that Imig’s patent attorney sent a letter to a patent research company noting his clients’ desire “to make a private label vacuum cleaner that is virtually identical in appearance” to defendant’s vacuum. The court also noted numerous visual similarities between the SANITAIRE vacuum and the PERFECT vacuum.

Notwithstanding Imid’s clear intent to copy, the court did not find liability. The court noted that Electrolux had not met its burden of establishing trade dress infringement. In order to establish trade dress infringement, the court wrote, a company must show that the product design is distinctive and that consumers are likely to be confused by seeing the distinctive trade dress on another product. The court held that the elements claimed by Electrolux were functional in nature, and that the company had not proved otherwise, despite Electrolux’s survey evidence showing consumers recognized the various elements of the vacuum as being uniquely from the SANITAIRE brand. The court also determined that secondary meaning had not been established, even though the product had been in use for several years. Addressing the issue of confusion, the court, citing Cadbury Beverages, Inc. v. Cott Corp. determined that Eletrolux had to show a “probability – not merely a ‘possibility’ – of confusion,” a burden that it also did not meet. Even with the victory on the copyright and false advertising claims, we’re guessing Electrolux thinks the decision, well, sucks.

Practice Note: One method of distinguishing trade dress elements is to use “look for” advertising tactics in marketing the products. If a product contains non-functional elements that truly distinguish the product, a company can generate recognition around those features by directing clients to look for them when they make a purchase. Such use may be more persuasive than survey evidence in making clear to both customers and competitors what elements of a design are trade dress.

Mallery v. NBC Universal, No. 07 Civ. 2250, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88960 (S.D.N.Y., December 3, 2007)

Another “absurd” (the court’s words) claim that a Hollywood studio stole plaintiffs’ ideas for a hit show. And another reminder that not all copying amounts to actionable copyright infringement. That two works of fiction have similar plot, scenes or characters does not necessarily mean there is infringement.

Plaintiffs claimed that the TV show “Heroes” was “strikingly similar” to a novel, short film and painting series they created. “Heroes” is a show that borrows from comic book lore and tells the intersecting stories of a diverse group of individuals who discover they have superhuman powers. In the first season, the characters try to prevent an explosion that is set to destroy New York City, as predicted in paintings created by a character who can draw the future (like the one shown below).

Plaintiffs claimed that “Heroes” was similar to their works in a number of ways. They claimed that it contained characters who were “minorities” and had the ability to paint the future. They also claimed that the stories both featured paintings depicting New York buildings destroyed and predictions that were validated in a newspaper. Other alleged similarities included close up eye images, twin characters, and characters trying to stop tragic events.

The court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment and held that any similarities between the works related to unprotectable ideas. Storylines such as a minority artist painting the future or heroes trying to stop a catastrophe are scenes à faire, that is to say elements that necessarily follow from the choice of storyline or situation and are not protected by copyright. The court also rejected plaintiff’s argument that the works had similar “total concept and feel.” It noted that any similarities were too abstract for a jury to find substantial similarities and that the two stories “differed in nearly every relevant way.”

This opinion follows a long-line of cases holding that similar stories and characters do not necessarily amount to copyright infringement; for example cases finding that a children’s book about a dinosaur zoo was not substantially similar to the film Jurassic Park, or that the character of Superman was not substantially similar to the TV show “Greatest American Hero.”

Dalton-Ross Homes, Inc. v. Williams, No. CV-06-1301-PCT-FJM, 2007 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 64135 (D. Ar. August 29, 2007).

This case highlights the crucial importance of registering works that copyright owners want to protect and enforce.

Plaintiff, a construction company, owned and registered the copyright in architectural floor Plan 1. A draftsman working for plaintiff prepared Plan 2, based on Plan 1, and Plan 3, based on Plan 2 (and, possibly, Plan 1). Defendants hired the same draftsman, who used plaintiff’s Plan 3 to prepare Plan 4 for defendants. Plaintiffs alleged that defendant’s Plan 4 infringed on plaintiff’s Plan 3, which was derivative of registered Plan 1. Plaintiff never registered its copyrights in Plans 2 or 3.

Dalton-Ross Homes’ Villa Del Mesa model
(“Plan 1″)

The court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment, stating that copyright registration is a prerequisite to bringing an action in federal court for copyright infringement (17 U.S.C. § 411). A separate registration was required for Plan 3, the derivative work that was the subject of the action. Registration of the underlying original work was not sufficient to create jurisdiction in a lawsuit for infringement of the unregistered derivative work.

The court noted that copying an unregistered derivative work might give rise to liability based on infringement of the registered underlying work, if plaintiff can establish that defendant copied protectable elements of the original work. In this case, plaintiff merely argued that Plan 4 was derivative of Plan 3, which in turn was derivative of Plan 2, which in turn was derivative of Plan 1. Plaintiff never directly argued infringement of Plan 1. If it had done so, the result of the case may have been different.

Jacobsen v. Katzer, No. C06-01905 JSW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63568 (N.D. Ca. August 17, 2007)

This little case about model railroad software addresses a debated issue in the open source community: on what basis can open source creators sue people who misuse their work. This case seems to suggest breach of contract is an available remedy, but not copyright infringement. The case also deals with copyright law preemption.

Plaintiff developed model train software made available on this online community. Plaintiff’s work was subject to a standard open source software license permitting members of the public to make copies, distribute and make derivative works, providing they gave credit to the creators. Plaintiff alleged that defendants used plaintiff’s software to develop and fraudulently patent their own software for model train enthusiasts. Plaintiff sued on a number of counts and moved for a preliminary injunction to enjoin defendants from willfully infringing plaintiff’s copyrighted materials.

The court first held that plaintiff’s claims of unfair competition and unjust enrichment were preempted by federal copyright law, as both counts dealt “exclusively” with the misappropriation of plaintiff’s copyrighted files, a subject matter within the Copyright Act. To survive preemption the state claims must protect different rights than copyright rights. The state claims here did not add the required “extra element” to change the nature of the action or the rights secured under copyright law.

The court then denied plaintiff’s injunction, stating that plaintiff’s claims sounded in contract, not copyright. The court held that, implicit in a non-exclusive license like this one was a promise not to sue for copyright infringement. That is not to say that a licensor may never sue for copyright infringement, but they may only do so when the licensee exceeds the scope of the license. In this case, the license, like all open source licenses, was intentionally broad, closing the door to a copyright claim.

Tiseo Architects, Inc. v. B &B Pools Serv. and Supply Co., No. 06-1819, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 17894 (6th Cir., July 20, 2007)

This case illustrates the long-standing, but sometimes forgotten, copyright principle: that one must first analyze whether the similarities between defendant’s and plaintiff’s works pertain to original elements of plaintiff’s work. If they do not, then there is no infringement.

First, the facts: B&B Pools hired Tiseo Architects to prepare design drawings for its store remodel; then later hired a new architect, Olson, to prepare the construction plans. Tiseo sued for copyright infringement.

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s finding of no infringement. Even when works are very similar and access to plaintiff’s work is obvious, defendant’s work must be substantially similar to protectable elements of plaintiff’s work. Filtering out the unoriginal, unprotectable elements of Plaintiff’s plans (such as elements dictated by the client or zoning regulations), the court reached the logical conclusion: there are not a lot of ways for an architect to draw plans for an existing office.

Practice Tip: Practitioners should take care to fully analyze the elements of their infringement cases. The result in this case might have been different if Plaintiff had briefed the similarities between the protectable elements of the drawings, which, according to the Sixth Circuit Court, it did not do.

WB Music Corp v. RTV Communications Group, Inc. 445 F.3d 538 (2d Cir. 2006)

In 7 separate CD products, RTV copied and distributed unauthorized copies of WB Music’s copyrights in 13 musical works. The trial court held that the infringement was willful and granted statutory damages for 7 infringments.

On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed and awarded 13 infringements. The damage calculation was properly the works taken not the works produced.

Roberts v. Keith 79 USPQ 2d 1368 (SDNY 2006)

This is a case of disclosure; biding one’s time; and that biding being seen as a fraud that tolled the three year statute of limitations.

Roberts wrote songs in 1976 and 1977 and showed them to Keith who stated that he had no interest in those works.

In 1980, Keith released the songs; and between 1997 – 2001, Keith’s song was re-released repeatedly in compilations.

Roberts sued Keith in 2003 for copyright infringement; and, Keith defended that the statute of limitations barred all infringements prior to 1999.

Court held that the Statute of Limitations was tolled by the fraud of Keith. Motion of dismiss on statute of limitations denied; case going forward.

Gilpin v. Siebert 419 F. Supp 2d 1288 (D. Or. 2006)

Bernadine Gilpin was an employee of the Portland Community College as a counselor. With another college employee, Al Gilpin, she co-authored a book, “College Survival and Success”.

In a copyright infringement action between the two authors, summary judgement was denied because there was insufficient evidence on whether the Work Made For Hire doctrine applied. The court noted that the record was insufficient to determine the following:
-whether the writing was incidental to job duties;
-whether work was created inside or outside the authorized work hours;
-whether the the writing was within her job description;
-whether the writing was written with the intent to benefit the college; and,
-whether the writing was inspired by or derivative to her work experience.

A veritable paint-by-numbers for a professor to own a copyright, it is.

Pritchett v. Pound No. 05-41445 December 18, 2006 (5th Cir)

Pound was an employee of Pritchett; and his employment agreement/ job description included that he would be“completing regular written
assignments and the development of new products and procedures;” and that “[s]hould the Employee produce any written materials in the course of
his work with the Employer, then such shall be done for and on behalf of the Employer and all work produced shall be the exclusive property of the Employer.”

While still employed in 1988 and 1989, Pound co-authored two books which Pritchett both filed for copyright applications at the United States Copyright Office, and published and sold successfully.

When completing the copyright application, Pritchett erroneously checked “NO” in response to the question, “Is this a Work Made For Hire?”; and went on to identify Pound as an “author” on that form. The copyright applications resulted in registrations; and an effort to correct that error at the Copyright Office was blundered in 1990.

In 1995, Pound died. Pritchett was generous in accomodating the widow including paying the entire one million dollar bonus that year even though Pound had only worked one quarter of that year.

In 2002, Pound’s widow sued Pritchett as a joint author demanding an accounting and damages.

Pritchett defended that Pound was not an author, and that the Work Made For Hire doctrine trumped the errors in the copyright application.

The Fifth Circuit agrees with Pritchett stating that a more clear agreement of the parties was needed to change the status of Work Made For Hire. The error in the copyright application was not substantive or effective in changing ownership.

Faessler v. United States Playing Card Co 1:05-cv-00581; U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio

Michael Faessler was a cadet at the United States Military Academy when he composed a playing card set modeled on the military ranking system (lowest rank correlates to lowest card and so on). Faeseller registered his set with the United States Copyright Office; offered to sell the cards through the military commissaries but was declined that opportunity.

Upon learning that his identical card sets were being manufactured, and distributed by the military commissary, Faessler sued.

Two of the defenses raised were that there is no copyright in the set; and that the location of copyright notice solely on the joker card and not on any of the other cards caused any copyright to be forfeit and the work in the public domain.

The trial court held that the copyright in the set is valid and enforceable; and that the notice on the joker card alone is sufficient.

Roger Miller Music, Inc. v. Sony/ATV Publishing 2007 WL 443048
In what is becoming a normative complicated and attenuated set of facts for a renewal case, this case involves whether the renewal of Roger Miller’s 1958 – 1964 music was timely.

Mary Miller, the widow of Roger, sued Sony for copyright infringement asserting that the Roger Miller estate and not Sony owned the renewal rights. Key to the complicated set of facts is that Sony filed the renewal documents on behalf of Miller personally in the twenty eighth year, before Miller died later in that same twenty eighth year.

This tee-ed up the question simply as: can a copyright renewal term vest before the renewal term begins?

The issue is further complicated because these pre-1978 musical works are now governed by the 1998 Bono Copyright Extension Act which states:

Section 304(c)(2)(A) At the expiration of the original term of copyright in a work specified in paragraph (1)(B) of this subsection, the copyright shall endure for a renewed and extended further term of 67 years, which —

(i) if an application to register a claim to such further term has been made to the Copyright Office within 1 year before the expiration of the original term of copyright, and the claim is registered, shall vest, upon the beginning of such further term, in the proprietor of the copyright who is entitled to claim the renewal of copyright at the time the application is made; or

(ii) if no such application is made or the claim pursuant to such application is not registered, shall vest, upon the beginning of such further term, in the person or entity that was the proprietor of the copyright as of the last day of the original term of copyright.

The trial court ruled that because Roger Miller was alive at the time that Sony filed the renewal, the renewal rights went to Sony.

The renewal rights of the pre-1978 works are proving to be valuable; and the courts are giving us more guidance on when and how the timing of the renewal dance works. More proof that copyrights are economically vibrant, still.

Tenn. Walking Horse v. Nat’l. Walking Horse 2007 WL 325774 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 31, 2007)

Out of Tennessee, we learn that facts about horses that are selected, arranged and organized in a registry are copyrightable.

Here are the facts: The Tennessee Walking Horses Breeders Association of America (TW) has been keeping a registry since 1935 which keeps the details of just under half a million horses’ pedigree and related information such as identifying details, unusual markings and legacy data.

In part precipitated by the controversy over ‘soring’ the Tennessee Walking Horse, a separate association, The National Walking Horse Association, (NWHA) was formed in 1998 to promote the breeding of that specific horse breed without the training technique called ‘soring’ that makes the horse lift their feet in the archetypal manner of that breed. In July of 2004, the NWHA rolled out a registry that was to be analogous, but separate from the TW registry.

TW obtained a copyright registration for its registry; and, filed a copyright infringement action against the NWHA alledging that the NWHA registry infringes the TW registry compilation copyright. TW’s summary judgment motion details that their registry comprises facts that are specifically selected, organized and arranged, including unique colors and combinations, markings, identifiers and abbreviations. (“blaze lower lip, sock left hind leg,
fetlock right hind leg”).

Judge Todd Campbell, of the Tennessee federal trial court ruled, in January of 2007, that the copyright registration is valid and that NWHA’s copying constituted copyright infringement. The court discarded the NWHA’s defense that that the small facts of that were used were ‘de minimis’.

A couple of individuals whose last names are Tucker and Ruth have filed a couple of important law suits in the last month. Class action law suits which means that the plaintiff is asserting that the true number of plaintiffs that form the ‘class’ in the ‘action’ are too numerous to count. The operative word is “individuals” here because that is the constituency of people who are downloading music from Apple’s iTunes and buying music from the conventional big music players (Sony, BMG, Universal, TimeWarner).

The two class action cases are based on a claim that Apple and the big music players are effectively a monopoly because they collectively are over 75% of the market providers of music; and, because they have deliberately and consciously disabled the individuals in the market from having the right/ability to use the music that they are acquiring over different platforms. In short, it is the choke hold that Apple and the big music players have over the music buyers options of how or where to play the music that is the problem.

The law suits are a further indication that the consumer market is growing intolerant with being dictated to and restricted in how the music plays. The ‘Consumer Technology Bill of Rights’ has been percolating through the grassroots communities for some time and involves these rights:

1. Users have the right to “time-shift” content that they have legally acquired.
This gives you the right to record video or audio for later viewing or listening. For example, you can use a VCR to record a TV show and play it back later.
2. Users have the right to “space-shift” content that they have legally acquired.
This gives you the right to use your content in different places (as long as each use is personal and non-commercial). For example, you can copy a CD to a portable music player so that you can listen to the songs while you’re jogging.
3. Users have the right to make backup copies of their content.
This gives you the right to make archival copies to be used in the event that your original copies are destroyed.
4. Users have the right to use legally acquired content on the platform of their choice.
This gives you the right to listen to music on your Rio, to watch TV on your iMac, and to view DVDs on your Linux computer.
5. Users have the right to translate legally acquired content into comparable formats.
This gives you the right to modify content in order to make it more usable. For example, a blind person can modify an electronic book so that the content can be read out loud.
6. Users have the right to use technology in order to achieve the rights previously mentioned.
This last right guarantees your ability to exercise your other rights. Certain recent copyright laws have paradoxical loopholes that claim to grant certain rights but then criminalize all technologies that could allow you to exercise those rights. In contrast, this Bill of Rights states that no technological barriers can deprive you of your other fair use rights.

These cases pursue number two and four, above, the right to space shift and the right to use legally acquired content on the platform of their choice.

The Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) seems to have gotten a grasp on the solution ahead of the big music company members who comprise the RIAA. Cary Sherman, president of the RIAA, recently joined in possibly supporting these two ‘rights’ when he said, “We are focused on interoperability”.

What interoperability will look like; and whether the leading device manufacturers, Apple and Microsoft, will begin to offer some version of ‘pret a porter’ remains to be seen. But the recipients of music are definately not passive recipients. Consumers want the music and they want to be able to take it with them beyond the machines from which they first legitimately access it. Watch this space. As it is known, we’ll be discussing it here.

Jeff Koons has contributed mightily to measuring the metes and bounds of what constitutes ‘fair use’ in making unauthorized use of someone else’s copyrights. He did it with images of puppies; he did it with celebrity photographs; and now, he’s done it again with ladies legs.

To begin at the beginning, Andrea Blanch, a professional photographer, took a series of photographs of women’s legs that were used in the August 2000 issue of “ALLURE” magazine.

Jeff Koons, in fulfilling on a commission from the Guggenheim Foundation and Deutsche Bank, elected to scan a portion of Blanch’s legs; and, then Koons took the digital scan of Blanch’s work and digitally superimposed those Blanch images against a background of pastoral landscapes. The resulting image is said to comprise to a ‘collage’ which was then reduced to templates for painting upon billboard sized canvases and entitled “EasyFun-Ethereal”. The Koons’ collage (with Blanch’s work embedded) was exhibited in 2000 and 2001 in Berlin and New York City.

Blanch sued; and, Koons succeeded at the trial court level on his defense of fair use. Blanch appealed; and the Second Circuit had a long look at the picture. After the court found that the first and second factors of the four-part fair use analysis demonstrated that the collage was both transformative and constituted social commentary. With ‘transformative’ recognized, it was not surprising that fair use was found, but it didn’t help when Blanch admitted that the use of her photographs did not harm her career, the market for her work or the value of the work in the market place. ( No. 05-6433-cv, 2nd Cir.; 2006)

Koons must be appreciated for his fondness for incurring legal fees. He is a Don Quixote of ‘Fair Use’ who has quite a track record for galvanizing fine copyright case law. Maybe there is a Guggenheim grant funding that quest on which Koons has led so many lawyers and students. Not surprisingly, Koons had his own team of lawyers; and the Guggenheim Foundation had their own team of lawyers; Deutsche Bank had their own team of lawyers…. and giving a grant to Koons begins to look like that old PRELL commercial for lawyers’ full employment.

Chris Gregerson, an individual professional photographer representing himself in Minneapolis federal court, fails in obtaining an injunction against a financial institution that appropriate his photograph of the Minneapolis skyline; but succeeded in eluding a defamation counterclaim.

Defendants use the allegedly infringing photograph in their real estate web ads, print ads, brochures and in third party business directory advertisements, changed only by the elimination of Gregerson’s copyright notice.

Gregerson, after learning of the infringement and finding no satisfaction in his demand that defendants stop infringement, posted on his own website to make his accusation of copyright infringement more public and explicit. The defendants in Chris Gregerson v. Vilana Financial Inc. et al (No. 06-1164, D. Minn.) counterclaimed that Gregerson’s website constituted defamation and trademark infringement. Specifically, the defendants claim that the organic search engine results are skewed as a result of the defendant’s trademarks depicted in Gregerson’s website.

Gregerson defended claiming a first amendment right to state his criticism of defendants.

This is another in a long line of cases where the First Amendment trumps intellectual property causes of action; and it especially predictable when the First Amendment claim includes a criticism.

Now with YouTube allowing 90,000 new videos to be posted daily, this action is remarkable not for the controversy but because Gregerson knew, could locate and serve the parties that are making allegedly unauthorized use of his photographs. Take a look at the YouTube site and especially the most popularly viewed. None of the photographs, music or other third party copyright is authorized on YouTube; and we haven’t see a spate of law suits. What a boon that safe harbor clause of the DMCA is for us all, right?

The U.S. Copyright Statute has two symmetrical parts to Section 102. The first subsection sets out what is protected (… original expression fixed in tangible medium…”) inside the tent of copyright so to speak; and the second subsection sets out what is prohibited from that tent’s protection (…. In no case shall copyright protection extend to idea, process, system, concept, method of operation…). Over time, we have come to understand that the metaphorical tent of copyright does not extend to function. For function protection, you have to go to the Patent Office’s tent.

But with our government being the best that money can buy, and given that there is more power in PAC lobbying than ever before, a new bill (S.17850) has passed the House and the Senate and needs now only minor ratification in the Senate before it is law. That new bill will extend copyright protection to function, specifically, vessel deck designs. This will be a further extension of the camel’s function nose in the copyright tent that the earlier 2005 legislation brought in protecting vessel hull designs.

This is legislation has been specially lobbied through by the small craft design and manufacturing community; and, is the harbinger of the garment design (‘fashion’) bill that is in line to be addressed next. The proposed garment design bill will grant a three year monopoly to garment designers on patterns and features of clothing. Who knows, perhaps the optical design and manufacturing community will succeed in proposing new legislation for optical gear which has eluded protection to their satisfaction… and then we’ll approach the whole head of the camel coming in under the tent of copyright.

Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 2006 WL 3182468 (E.D. Va. Nov. 3, 2006)

Pamela Reeder is the founder of Haute Diggity Dog which is dedicated to making fun of our globalized disease of affluenza while making some of her mortgage payment. Her company is self described as a “parody, plush, pet toy company” and the images of her products are depicted below, including “Sniffany & Co,” “Chewnell No. 5″ and “Chewy Vuiton.”

When Louis Vuitton filed a trademark and dilution action in Virginia against the parodist, the court lost no time in ruling in favor of Haute Diggity Dog, saying:

“This dog of a case gave the court a great amount of facts to chew upon and applicable law to sniff out. Nonetheless, having thoroughly gnawed through the record, this Court finds that no material dispute of the fact remain.”

and:

“The name “Chewy Vuiton” is, like “Timmy Holedigger,” an obvious parody of a famous brand name. The fact that the real Vuitton name, marks, and dress are strong and recognizable makes it unlikely that a parody-particularly one involving a pet chew toy and bed–will be confused with the real product.”

Vuitton also claimed copyright infringement. Why not just trademark infringement? Because, in 2002, Vuitton collaborated with Japanese pop artist Takashi Murakami to re-invent Vuitton’s signature gold and brown monogram design. What resulted was a multicolor monogram design and a line of handbags and accessories that inspired a cult-like following. It seems that Murakami filed a copyright application for his design in 2002. On-line Copyright Office records list Vuitton as claimant and the work as “work made for hire.”

The opinion raised the question of ownership of the copyright but concluded that the issue was irrelevant because defendant’s use of the copyrighted work was fair use, specifically a parody.

It is interesting to note that the court analyzed whether “Chewy Vuitton” and the “CL” monogram constituted copyright fair use, even though LOUIS VUITTON and the VL monogram are really trademarks, not copyrights. The issue should have been instead whether defendant’s overall design and arrangement of colors constituted fair use of the Murakami copyrighted design.

The case of MGM v. Grokster continues while everyone has moved on. Streamcast, one of the defendants, in the action was found liable under copyright contributory infringement for the Morpheus software.

Judge Wilson in Los Angeles held “evidence of Streamcast’s unlawful intent is overwhelming” in the way that the Morpheus encouraged users to violate copyright law.

Two other defendants, Grokster and Kazaa, have already settled.

Recently, the Belgian Court of First Instance ordered Google to both cease excerpting snippets of text from French and German-speaking papers; and that Google post the injunction order on the Google website.

Google contintues to scan thousands of news outlets and books and has done so since 2002.

The Belgian court was unmoved by Google’s defense that the snippet copying was intended to drive traffic to the originating news site. Google found the order to post on the Google website the Belgian website “disporportionate and unnecessary”.

Perhaps the most underreported area of copyright infringement in the last decade has been in the home craft and stitching community. The needlepointers have made wholesale, unauthorized copies of patterns; the garment and accessory (patterns which in the ’60′s we paid handsomely to meet our home economics and merit badge requirements) bespoke community have made unauthorized copies galore; and now we have a case involving those plastic cards that we pop into our high tech modern sewing machines.

The Eighth Circuit recently affirmed summary judgement for the craft store that was renting the plastic, memory cards from which the sewing machine takes the direction for producing the embroidery designs. Action Tapes, Inc. V. Mattson (Nos. 05-3309m 05-3520 (8th Cir. Aug 30, 2006).)

The plaintiff, Action Tapes, failed to register the computer software and the requisite source code in the Copyright Office under the 1990 Computer Software Rental Amendments Act.

This, a case of first impression, gives a good map of where the next software embroidery designs plaintiff needs to go to succeed next time.